Maharashtra Devasthan Inams Abolition (Draft) Act, 2026: Infringement of Denominational Property Rights & Religious Autonomy

Examining its Constitutional Validity under Article 26 of the Constitution of India

Abstract

The Maharashtra Devasthan Inams Abolition (Draft) Act, 2026 (the Act) seeks to abolish inams held by religious and charitable institutions across Maharashtra. While land reform legislation generally enjoys the protection of the Ninth Schedule, the Act raises profound constitutional concerns under Article 26 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees every religious denomination the right to own, acquire and administer property in accordance with law. This analysis demonstrates that multiple provisions of the Act, taken individually and cumulatively, violate the core constitutional guarantees of Article 26(c) and (d), run afoul of the principle of religious neutrality under Articles 14 and 15, and cannot be saved by reference to regulatory power alone. The analysis draws on the settled jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India, traces the legislative architecture of the Act section by section, and makes the case that the Act, in its present form, is constitutionally vulnerable and requires substantial reworking. 

I.  Introduction and Legislative Context

The inam system in India traces its origins to pre-colonial land grants by ruling authorities such as Peshwas, Nizam, Maratha chiefs to religious institutions (Devasthans) as a form of endowment. An inam was, in essence, a revenue assignment: the grantee held the land free of, or at reduced, land revenue, and the surplus income sustained the institution’s religious or charitable purposes. Post-Independence, the Indian States embarked on a comprehensive programme of land reform aimed at abolishing intermediary tenures, conferring ownership on tillers, and eliminating feudal vestiges. Maharashtra’s earlier efforts included the Bombay Taluqdars’ Relief Act, the Bombay Inams (Kutch State) Abolition Act, and several zonal statutes.

The Draft Act of 2026 now proposes a comprehensive sweep of all Devasthan inams across the State (save for those already covered by the Hyderabad enactments and the Waqf Act, 1995). Its architecture is straightforward: upon the ‘appointed day’, all Devasthan inams are extinguished (§ 3); the land becomes liable to land revenue under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (MLRC), 1966; and occupancy rights are redistributed to existing holders (§ 4), with provision for eviction of unauthorised holders (§ 5). Transactions in grabbed land are voided (§ 7); criminal penalties attach to land grabbing (§ 8); and public utility land vests in the State (§ 9).

Read on its face, the Act appears to be routine land reform. However, a careful constitutional analysis reveals that the Act directly trenches upon the rights guaranteed to religious denominations under Article 26 of the Constitution, rights which the Supreme Court has consistently held to be co-equal in dignity to the freedoms under Article 25 and not lightly abridged by general welfare legislation.

II.  Article 26 : Text, Scope and Jurisprudential Framework

A.  The Constitutional Text

Article 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs : Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law.

Three features of Article 26 are immediately significant for the present analysis:

• Denomination-specific guarantee: Unlike Article 25, which confers rights on individuals, Article 26 vests rights in a ‘religious denomination’, a collectivity that has a common faith, a common organisation and is designated by a distinctive name. A Devasthan, as the custodian of a temple or charitable institution maintained by a denominational community, qualifies as, or is the legal expression of, a religious denomination for Article 26 purposes.
• Qualified by law, not by all law: Clauses (c) and (d) are subject to the qualification ‘in accordance with law’, but this qualification does not convert the right into a bare privilege. The Supreme Court has consistently held that law cannot be deployed to destroy the essence of the right; it can only regulate the manner of administration, not extinguish the right to own or administer altogether.
• Subject only to public order, morality and health: Article 26, unlike Article 19, does not permit the State to curtail denominational rights on grounds of ‘public interest’ or ‘reasonable restrictions’ in the Article 19(6) sense. The restriction clause in Article 26 is far narrower, confined to public order, morality and health.

B.  Key Supreme Court Pronouncements

The following decisions are foundational and directly applicable:

1. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt  |  AIR 1954 SC 282 (Shirur Mutt) – Established the critical distinction between ‘matters of religion’ (protected absolutely under Art. 26(b)) and ‘secular activities associated with religion’ (amenable to regulation). The administration of the endowed property of a Math is a ‘secular’ activity, but it remains the denomination’s right to administer it under Art. 26(d).
2. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay  |  AIR 1954 SC 388 – Held that while the State may regulate the administration of religious and charitable trusts, it cannot under the guise of regulation, divest religious denominations of their property or take away their right to administer it. ‘Administration’ cannot be converted into ‘deprivation’.
3. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India  |  AIR 1983 SC 1 – Identified three essential elements of a ‘religious denomination’: (i) collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being; (ii) a common organisation; and (iii) designation by a distinctive name. Hindu temple trusts and Devasthans associated with a particular sect or community qualify.
4. Azeez Basha v. Union of India  |  AIR 1968 SC 662 – Confirmed that Art. 26 applies only to denominations that ‘established’ the institution. However, where an institution has been established by a denominational community over centuries and nurtured by them, they retain all Art. 26 rights.
5. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka  |  AIR 2003 SC 355 (11-Judge Bench) – While principally concerned with educational institutions, the Court reaffirmed the right to administer property under Art. 26(d) cannot be reduced to a husk by State interference that has the practical effect of displacing denominational management entirely.
6. Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple v. State of U.P.  |  AIR 1997 SC 288 – The State may step in to administer a temple when its management is grossly mismanaged or where corruption is established, but this requires a fact-specific finding; blanket legislative extinguishment of all temple property rights across the board is a categorically different, and constitutionally impermissible, exercise.
7. Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore  |  AIR 1958 SC 255 – Confirmed that where the right claimed under Art. 26 and Art. 25 are in conflict, Art. 26 will prevail in so far as the right of the denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and to administer its property is concerned 

III.  Section-by-Section Constitutional Analysis

A.  Section 3 : Wholesale Abolition of Devasthan Inams

Provision

Section 3: Notwithstanding any usage or custom, settlement, grant, agreement, Sanad or order… with effect on and from the appointed day  (a) all Devasthan inams… shall be and are hereby abolished; (b) all rights legally subsisting immediately before the said day… shall be and are hereby extinguished. 

Constitutional Infirmity

Section 3 is the anchor provision and also the most constitutionally vulnerable. It operates as a universal, non-discriminating extinguishment of all Devasthan property interests in a single legislative stroke, without any inquiry into whether a particular Devasthan is mismanaged, whether the inam is being misused, or whether there is any constitutional justification specific to that institution.

The right to own property under Article 26(c) is not a right to perpetual immunity from all regulation, but it is a right that can only be interfered with on grounds that are constitutionally permissible. Section 3 abolishes inam rights for all Devasthans, well-managed and ill-managed alike, without any nexus to the grounds of ‘public order, morality or health’ which alone constrain Article 26. The following specific infirmities arise:

1. No nexus to Art. 26 restriction grounds: The section makes no attempt to demonstrate that the Devasthan inams, as a class, threaten public order, morality, or health. The driving rationale is agrarian reform and revenue maximization, policy objectives which, however legitimate in the general context of Art. 31A (which applies to ‘estates’), cannot override the fundamental rights of denominations qua denominations under Art. 26.
2. Extinguishment ≠ Regulation: The Supreme Court in Ratilal (supra) drew a sharp distinction between regulating the manner in which a denomination administers its property (permissible) and taking away the property itself or the right to administer it (impermissible). Section 3(b) expressly ‘extinguishes’ all rights, going well beyond regulation into outright deprivation.
3. Retrospective application to valid grants: Inams were granted by sovereign authority through Sanads, legal instruments of high standing. Section 3 overrides even Court decrees (‘anything contained in any decree or order of a court’). This conflicts with the settled legal position that rights crystallised by judicial orders have the highest protective status.
4. Violation of Art. 26(c), Right to Own: The extinguishment of the denominational ownership interest strikes at the core of Art. 26(c). The denomination’s right to own the land from which it derives income to sustain its religious activities is not an incidental right; it is integral to its identity and functioning. Abolition without just cause or compensation (see below) is constitutionally indefensible.

B.  Section 4 : Reallocation of Occupancy Rights Without Denominational Consent

Provision

Section 4: The person deemed to be the occupant primarily liable to the State Government for payment of land revenue… shall be, (b) where such land is in possession of an authorised holder, Mirasdar, Tenant or inferior holder who cultivates such land personally: such authorised holder, Mirasdar, Tenant, or inferior holder… 

Constitutional Infirmity

Section 4 operationalises the abolition by redistributing occupancy rights (effectively, ownership) to sitting cultivators, tenants, and inferior holders. Several Article 26 violations arise:

1. Forced divestiture of denominational ownership: By conferring ‘Occupant Class I’ status on the tenant or inferior holder, the Act converts what was the Devasthan’s land into the cultivator’s land. The denomination loses its asset base permanently. Even where an occupancy price is payable to the Devasthan under § 4(2) and (4), this does not remedy the constitutional violation, it merely acknowledges the taking while offering inadequate compensation by way of nazarana, which may not reflect true market value for revenue land.
2. Ceiling provisions extinguish even the residual: The proviso to § 4(1)(b) provides that occupancy rights shall not exceed the ‘ceiling holding limit’ and that land exceeding the ceiling ‘shall be resumed by the Collector and restored to the Devasthan or Inamdar’. While this appears protective, it creates an anomaly: land is taken away, and only the excess beyond ceiling restored, with no guarantee that the residue is adequate to sustain the denomination’s religious activities.
3. Gaothan lands stripped without nazarana (§ 4(5)): Sub-section (5) provides that Gaothan land in continuous residential possession since before 01.01.2011 shall be regranted to the holder as Occupant Class I without any occupancy price. This is pure divestiture: the Devasthan receives nothing, loses its land, and has no recourse. The constitutional invalidity of a zero-compensation transfer of denomination-owned property is manifest.
4. Absence of hearing for Devasthan: The Act does not require that the Devasthan be given an opportunity to contest the grant of occupancy rights to a sitting holder before rights are transferred. This procedural deficit compounds the substantive violation, Art. 26 rights cannot be taken away even by executive action without due process.

C.  Section 5 : Eviction and Regrant: Disproportionate State Intervention

Provision

Section 5: Where any Devasthan land is in possession of an unauthorised holder, such land shall be resumed and the unauthorised holder shall be summarily evicted… Provided that the Collector may regrant such land to the unauthorised holder as Occupant Class-I, subject to the following conditions: (a) Continuous possession since prior to 01.01.2011; (b) Government opinion that eviction would involve undue hardship… 

Constitutional Infirmity

Section 5 is doubly problematic. On its face, it provides for eviction of unauthorised holders, a power that ostensibly protects Devasthan interests. But the proviso completely subverts this: the very Collector who evicts can immediately regrant the same land to the same person on broad, subjective criteria. The following infirmities arise:

1. Collector’s subjective discretion overrides denominational rights: The criterion for regrant includes the State Government’s ‘opinion’ that eviction would involve ‘undue hardship’. This is an entirely open-ended standard that subordinates the denomination’s constitutionally guaranteed property right to the executive’s policy preference. The Supreme Court in Shirur Mutt held that Article 26 rights cannot be made dependent on executive discretion.
2. Occupation since 2011 as the tipping point: The date 01.01.2011 appears entirely arbitrary. There is no constitutional or policy principle that a person who has been in unauthorised possession since that date acquires a quasi-right to be regranted land that belongs to a religious denomination. The law of adverse possession does not apply to trust and religious institution property (confirmed under § 10 read with the restriction on transfer). Using an administrative cut-off to divest the denomination is not a constitutionally cognisable basis.
3. Restriction to ‘economic holding’ artificially caps denominational recovery: Sub-section (3) provides that land exceeding economic holding in unauthorised possession shall be restored to the Devasthan. But this means that if the unauthorised occupant holds within the ‘economic holding’ limit, the entire parcel is potentially regranted to him, with no residue restored. A religious denomination’s right to administer its land does not depend on whether the unauthorised holder’s encroachment exceeds or falls within an economic holding limit, these are distinct and constitutionally irrelevant criteria.
4. Zero nazarana for Gaothan lands (§ 5(2)): Mirroring § 4(5), this sub-section extinguishes the denomination’s interest in Gaothan lands for nothing. This is constitutionally indistinguishable from confiscation.

D.  Section 9 : Vesting of ‘Public Purpose’ Lands in the State Government

Provision

Section 9: All public roads, lanes and paths, bridges, ditches…beds of rivers, streams and nalas, lakes, wells, tanks…and all lands in respect of which no person is deemed to be an occupant under this Act…shall vest in, and shall be deemed to be…the property of the State Government and all rights held by a Devasthan in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished. 

Constitutional Infirmity

Section 9 is a sweeping residuary vesting clause that transfers to the State all Devasthan land for which occupancy is not established under the Act. This raises multiple, serious constitutional issues:

1. Extinguishment without any compensation: Unlike a compulsory acquisition under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (LARR Act), Section 9 provides no compensation whatsoever to the Devasthan for land vesting in the State. The complete absence of compensation for the extinguishment of the denomination’s interest is constitutionally untenable. Even if Art. 31 (right to property) is no longer a fundamental right, the Act must comply with Art. 300A (no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law), which requires fair compensation for State acquisition.
2. Open-ended residuary scope: The section captures ‘all lands in respect of which no person is deemed to be an occupant under this Act’. This is an extraordinarily wide net. A Devasthan may hold land that is used for non-agricultural religious purposes, for instance, land on which a temple tank, a marriage hall, or a dharamshala stands, and for which no ‘occupancy’ right is established. All such land would vest in the State, effectively confiscating the physical infrastructure of the religious institution itself.
3. ‘Mines and minerals’ vesting extinguishes an independent asset class: The section provides that mines and minerals, whether discovered or not, within Devasthan land shall vest in the State. This amounts to a pre-emptive acquisition of unknown sub-surface rights, an additional taking beyond the surface land, without any consideration.
4. Conflict with the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950: Section 17 of the Act purports to save the operation of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act. However, § 9’s vesting of Devasthan land in the State is fundamentally incompatible with the trust framework, which treats the denomination as the beneficial owner of trust property held for religious purposes. The two provisions pull in opposite directions, creating interpretive and operational conflict.

E.  Section 10 : Restriction on Alienation without Government Permission

Provision

Section 10: The land which vests in Devasthan as occupant shall not be transferred without prior permission of the State Government. 

Constitutional Infirmity

Ironically, Section 10, ostensibly a protective provision for the Devasthan, creates a fresh constitutional problem. By requiring prior government permission for any transfer by the Devasthan, the Act:

1. Violates Art. 26(d), right to administer: The right to administer property includes the right to deal with it, sell, lease, mortgage, dedicate, in furtherance of the institution’s religious or charitable purposes. Converting that right into a conditional privilege subject to State veto is a direct impairment of Art. 26(d). The Supreme Court in Shirur Mutt specifically stated that the right to administer connotes ‘management of affairs in the way the denomination thinks best’.
2. Creates an infinite regulatory veto: There is no standard, criterion, or timeline for granting or refusing Government permission. An institution may be denied permission for months or years, effectively freezing its ability to manage its own assets. This amounts to ‘death by a thousand administrative cuts’, a cumulative violation of Art. 26(d).
3. Disparate treatment: A private landowner who holds occupancy rights faces no such restriction on transfer. Only Devasthans are singled out for this additional layer of control, raising an equality concern under Art. 14 (discussed further below).

F.  Sections 6 and 14, Ouster of Civil Courts and Adequacy of the Adjudicatory Mechanism

Provision

Section 14: No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the officer authorised under section 4 or the Collector, the State Government in appeal or revision or in exercise of their powers of control. 

Constitutional Infirmity

The ouster of civil court jurisdiction, while common in land reform statutes, raises specific constitutional concerns in the context of denomination rights:

1. Adequacy of the revenue adjudicatory forum: Questions under § 6, including whether a person is a Devasthan, whether land is held under a Devasthan Inam, and whether persons are Mirasdar, Pujari, or lawful assignees, are jurisdictional questions of profound legal complexity. Entrusting them to revenue officers (Additional Collectors and Divisional Commissioners), with final revision lying with the State Government itself, does not provide the judicial independence and competence that an Art. 26 right demands.
2. Revision by the State Government is constitutionally anomalous: Under § 6(3), revision lies to the ‘State Government’, the very executive authority that enacted the legislation and that has a direct financial interest in the outcome. Allowing the same authority to exercise revision over orders that determine denominational property rights violates the principle of a fair hearing before an independent adjudicator, implicit in Art. 26 read with Art. 21.
3. Section 6(4) bars challenge in any court: The provision that the Collector’s decision is ‘final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any suit or proceeding in any court’ is of questionable constitutional validity. While Parliament and State Legislatures may restrict civil court jurisdiction, they cannot oust the jurisdiction of High Courts and the Supreme Court under Arts. 226 and 32 respectively, which are part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The provision’s validity will depend on whether it is read down to exclude only civil suits and not constitutional remedies.
4. No appeal to a judicial tribunal for criminal matters: The criminal penal provisions of § 8 operate independently through ‘courts of competent jurisdiction’, but the civil and revenue determinations that are the predicate for criminal liability are made by executive officers. This structural inconsistency may raise due process concerns under Art. 21.

G.  Sections 7 and 8 : The Land Grabbing Provisions

Provision

Section 7(2): Any person who unauthorisedly occupies or continues to be in occupation of Devasthan land, other than: (a) an authorised holder, Mirasdar, or lawful tenant as recognized under Section 4; or (b) an unauthorised holder to whom the land has been regranted under the proviso to Section 5, shall be deemed to be a land grabber. 

Constitutional Infirmity

While the anti-land-grabbing provisions are broadly supportable as a protection of denominational property, they give rise to one constitutional tension:

1. Circular protection: The definition of ‘land grabber’ in § 7(2) exempts persons to whom land has been regranted under § 5. But the regrant under § 5 itself constitutes a divestiture of denominational property without adequate constitutional basis (as argued above). The protection against land grabbing therefore creates a safe harbour for precisely those persons who have benefited from constitutionally suspect regranting, effectively insulating the violation from further challenge.
2. Voiding of alienations (§ 7(4)): All transactions relating to ‘alienation of grabbed Devasthan land’ are declared null and void ab initio. This is broadly supportable, but care must be taken that this provision is not read so broadly as to invalidate bona fide historical transactions that pre-date the Act and were made under colour of title, an outcome that would raise Art. 300A concerns for the alienees.

IV.  Structural Violations: Articles 14, 15 and the Principle of Religious Neutrality

A.  Selective Exclusions and the Equality Problem

Section 1(2) of the Act carves out from its scope: (i) lands covered under the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act, 1954; (ii) the Hyderabad Atiyat Inquiries Act, 1952; and (iii) the Waqf Act, 1995.

The exclusion of Waqf properties is particularly constitutionally significant. Waqf is the Islamic legal institution of a pious endowment, functionally analogous to a Hindu Devasthan inam. The Act abolishes Hindu (and generically ‘religious’) inams while leaving Waqf endowments entirely untouched. This differential treatment requires rigorous constitutional justification under Article 14.

The Supreme Court’s test under Art. 14 is: (i) the classification must be founded on intelligible differentia; and (ii) the differentia must have a rational nexus with the object of the legislation. The ‘object’ of the Act is land reform and the protection of cultivating tenants. If that is the object, the classification between Devasthan inams and Waqf endowments has no rational nexus with that object, both categories of land are similarly situated from a land reform perspective. The exclusion of Waqf lands must be justified, and in the absence of a principled basis, it discriminates against Hindu religious institutions in violation of Art. 14 and Art. 15(1) (which prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion).

The Puttaswamy principle extends constitutional equality to institutions: a State that takes land from temple trusts without taking equivalent action against mosques, churches or Sikh gurdwaras is engaging in religion-based discrimination. This is precisely the pattern of the Act, and it invites constitutional invalidation.

B.  Absence of Compensation : Violation of Art. 300A

Post the 44th Constitutional Amendment, the right to property is no longer a fundamental right but remains a constitutional right under Art. 300A: ‘No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.’ The Supreme Court has, in numerous decisions since Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1995 SC 142) onwards, held that Art. 300A imposes an obligation to pay fair compensation upon deprivation of property. Where Devasthan lands are transferred to cultivators, or vest in the Government under § 9, without adequate compensation, the Act trenches upon Art. 300A.

The ‘occupancy price’ payable under §§ 4 and 5 is calculated on the basis of prescribed rules not yet framed, creating an additional constitutional infirmity. When the quantum of compensation is left entirely to subordinate legislation, the legislature has not itself guaranteed ‘just and adequate compensation’, which the Constitution demands. The Supreme Court’s decision in K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 is directly applicable, it held that Art. 300A requires the authority of law and a fair procedure, and that sub-constitutional rules cannot substitute for a legislatively prescribed compensation mechanism.

V.  Ninth Schedule Protection and Its Limits

The State may seek to include the Act in the Ninth Schedule to insulate it from fundamental rights challenges, following the pattern of earlier inam abolition legislation. However, this avenue is not available without limit after I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 2007 SC 861), which held that Ninth Schedule inclusion does not immunise legislation that violates fundamental rights forming part of the basic structure, and that judicial review under Arts. 32 and 226 cannot be completely barred even for Ninth Schedule laws.

The right of religious denominations under Art. 26 has been treated by the Supreme Court as an aspect of the right to religious freedom, a foundational feature of the constitutional order. Any attempt to include the Act in the Ninth Schedule will therefore face challenge on the ground that its operation destroys the essence of Art. 26, which is a basic structure element (as held in SR Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918, where secularism, of which equal treatment of denominations is an aspect, was identified as basic structure).

Furthermore, Art. 31A, which protects land reform legislation from challenge under Arts. 14 and 19, does not protect against Art. 26 claims. Art. 31A(1) in terms provides that the acquisition of an ‘estate’ or of any rights therein shall not be void on the ground of inconsistency with Articles 14 and 19, but it says nothing about Art. 26. A Devasthan Inam, in so far as it is held for religious denomination purposes, invokes Art. 26 and is not saved by Art. 31A.

VI.  The Proportionality Test and Manifest Arbitrariness

Post the Supreme Court’s decision in Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353, a proportionality analysis applies to restrictions on fundamental rights. Even if one were to accept that the State has a legitimate aim in abolishing inams (viz., agrarian reform and protecting cultivators), the proportionality test requires that:

1. The measure must be suitable: Abolishing the denomination’s property rights is certainly capable of achieving the goal of conferring land on cultivators. This prong may be satisfied.
2. The measure must be necessary: However, the same goal could be achieved by granting occupancy rights to cultivators while preserving the denomination’s right to receive fair compensation equivalent to market value, as indeed the LARR Act requires for any compulsory acquisition. The Act does not explore less restrictive alternatives, failing the necessity test.
3. The measure must be proportionate in the strict sense: The benefit to individual cultivators must be weighed against the permanent institutional damage to religious denominations whose income, maintenance and identity are bound up with the inam lands. The Act makes no such balancing exercise and provides no floor of compensation that respects the religious dimension of the deprivation.
4. Manifest arbitrariness: The Supreme Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 established that legislation that is manifestly arbitrary, i.e., excessive, capricious or without adequate determining principle, violates Art. 14. The zero-nazarana regrant of Gaothan lands (§§ 4(5) and 5(2)), the unlimited Collector’s discretion in § 5, and the absence of any compensation formula in § 9 all satisfy the test of manifest arbitrariness.

VII.  Summary Table of Constitutional Infirmities

Section	Nature of Violation	Article(s) Violated	Severity
§ 3	Universal extinguishment of all inam rights without nexus to Art. 26 limitation grounds	Art. 26(c), 26(d), 300A	Critical
§ 4(1)(b)	Forced transfer of occupancy to cultivators; permanent loss of denominational asset base	Art. 26(c), 26(d), 300A	Critical
§§ 4(5) & 5(2)	Zero-nazarana regrant of Gaothan lands, confiscatory	Art. 26(c), 26(d), 300A, 14	Critical
§ 5 (proviso)	Collector’s subjective discretion to regrant to unauthorised holders	Art. 26(d), 14	High
§ 9	Residuary vesting of all unoccupied Devasthan land in State without compensation	Art. 26(c), 300A	Critical
§ 10	Blanket prohibition on transfer without State permission, no criteria or time limit	Art. 26(d)	High
§ 6(3)	Revision lies to State Government (executive interest), lack of independent adjudicator	Art. 26, 21	Medium
§§ 1(2), 3	Exclusion of Waqf but inclusion of Devasthan inams, religious discrimination	Art. 14, 15(1)	High
§ 4(2)/(4)	Compensation (occupancy price) left entirely to sub-legislative rules, no legislative guarantee	Art. 300A, 26(c)	Medium
§ 3(b)	Extinguishment of Court decree rights, ouster of judicial orders	Art. 21, 26	Medium

VIII.  Comparative Perspective: Valid Land Reform vs. Unconstitutional Appropriation

India’s land reform jurisprudence has evolved a workable distinction between constitutionally permissible and impermissible legislative action vis-à-vis religious institution property:

Constitutionally PERMISSIBLE	Constitutionally IMPERMISSIBLE
Regulating how the denomination administers property (accounts, audits, spending)	Abolishing the denomination’s ownership interest in the property entirely
Appointing a statutory trustee to oversee administration in cases of proven mismanagement	Blanket vesting of all unoccupied Devasthan land in the State without compensation
Conferring occupancy rights on tenants with full and fair compensation to the denomination	Zero-nazarana regranting of Gaothan lands to holders, confiscatory taking
Imposing ceiling limits on land held by private individuals (including temple trustees in their personal capacity)	Restricting the denomination’s right to transfer its own land without executive permission and without criteria
Requiring denomination to account for income and apply it to religious/charitable purposes	Leaving compensation quantum entirely to subordinate rules, with no legislative guarantee of adequacy

IX.  Conclusion

The Maharashtra Devasthan Inams Abolition (Draft) Act, 2026 represents a significant instance of legislative overreach in the domain of constitutionally protected denominational rights. While the legislative goal of protecting cultivators and rationalising revenue administration is entirely legitimate, the chosen method, wholesale extinguishment of Devasthan property interests without adequate compensation, with sweeping executive discretion, selective exclusion of comparable Islamic endowments, and virtual confiscation of Gaothan lands, is deeply constitutionally flawed.

The act does not seek to define a denominational inam or sectional inam devastanams are not taken as belonging to denominations or sections there of and therefore by virtue The Act violates Article 26(c) by stripping religious denominations of the right to own the property that has historically constituted their material foundation. It violates Article 26(d) by divesting denominations of the right to administer their remaining property without prior State consent on undefined grounds. It violates Article 14 by treating Hindu Devasthans differently from Islamic Waqf endowments without rational basis. And it violates Article 300A by taking property without adequate or legislatively guaranteed compensation. It violates further article 26 because a devasthanam inam by virtue is dedicated for the purpose of maintenance of some aspect of service or of the deity and as such also violates Article 25 and as well as Article 26 c as these properties are invariables granted for the maintenance of the religious institutions 

The saving grace of the Act, if any, lies in its anti-land-grabbing provisions (§§ 7 and 8), which do serve a legitimate protective function. But those provisions cannot redeem the constitutionally infirm core. The Act, as presently drafted, would in all likelihood not survive a challenge before the Supreme Court. It requires fundamental structural revision to reconcile the legitimate goal of land reform with the irreducible constitutional entitlements of India’s religious denominations.

“The right of every religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and to administer its property is not a privilege but a constitutional entitlement, one that the State cannot take away under the guise of regulation, however beneficent the legislative purpose may be.”

— Derived from Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282) and Ratilal (AIR 1954 SC 388)